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Sammendrag 
Dette arbeidet utvikler et nytt og forbedret mål på den såkalte skattefinansieringskostnaden. En viktig 
forbedring er at det nye målet har som referanse en hypotetisk finansiering av offentlig konsum som er 
fordelingsnøytral i tillegg til at den ikke har negative effektivitetsvirkninger. Dette står i kontrast til det 
målet på skattefinansieringskostnaden som er brukt i den relevante forskningslitteraturen tidligere. 
Den har brukt som referansemål et likt skattebeløp på hvert individ, også kalt koppskatt. En slik 
koppskatt er klart regressiv og kan ha svært ugunstige fordelingsegenskaper. Det er derfor uheldig å 
benytte denne som referanse når en skal måle de reelle fordelingseffektene av skatter. Vårt mål på 
skattefinansieringskostnaden vil mer presist ta hensyn til fordelingsvirkningene av skattene som 
brukes og gjør samtidig en klarere grenseoppgang mot hva som er fordelingseffektene av det 
offentlige godet som skal finansieres. Sammenlignet med tidligere litteratur finner vi at med vårt mål 
på skattefinansieringskostnaden så er den høyere både for en koppskatt og for alminnelige 
inntektsskatter. På grunn av sine regressive egenskaper finner vi at skattefinansieringskostnaden ved 
bruk av koppskatter er høyere enn 1 mens den tidligere har vært antatt å være 1 når den ikke 
kombineres med andre skatter. Vi finner altså at det koster mer enn 1 krone å finansiere offentlig 
konsum også med en koppskatt. Mer generelt finner vi at med vårt mål på 
skattefinansieringskostnaden er den høyere enn det man tidligere har antatt. 
 
1 Introduction
Inequality is high on the political agenda, but economists still struggle to provide
advice on how distributional concerns should affect public goods provision. Failure
to account for the distributional aspects of both public goods and the tax schemes
used to fund them, can lead to greater inequality and can make redistribution
more costly. Furthermore, failure to account for distributional aspects could lead
decision-makers to disregard economics as a useful source of advice on how to
combat inequality.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a new measure for the
marginal cost of public funds (MCF) which more correctly accounts for the distri-
butional aspects of taxation than the standard MCF-measure of previous litera-
ture. The paper also proposes a corresponding measure for the distributional char-
acteristics of public goods. Together, the proposed measures distinguish clearly
between the distributional characteristics of a public good on one hand, and of
the taxes used to fund it on the other. The proposed measures are intuitive and
should make the important insights of the literature on taxation, public goods and
distribution more accessible. Hence, the paper provides a way forward for govern-
ments that want to take distribution into account in a consistent and transparent
manner.
According to the original Samuelson rule, a public good shall be supplied until
the aggregate marginal willingness to pay for it is equal to the marginal cost
of providing it (Samuelson, 1954). If individualized lump-sum (ILS) taxes were
available, there would be no deadweight loss from taxation, and redistribution
could be carried out at no cost. Thus, with ILS taxes the first best could be
attained. However, no government actually has unlimited access to such costless
redistribution and funding. When there are costs to taxation, one must modify
the Samuelson rule and pursue the second best.
The second-best solution to a government’s problem of public goods provision
depends on whether distribution of income and welfare across individuals matters
or not. When distribution is irrelevant, the potential efficiency loss from distortive
taxation is the only concern in the second best. If distortive taxation leads to
inefficiently low labor supply, the second-best provision of public goods is lowered
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compared to the first best (Pigou, 1947, p. 34). If the distortive tax is the
only source for public funding, MCF is a number greater than one, which can
be applied as a corrective factor to the marginal cost of production to find the
actual cost to society of providing a public good.1 This also applies to the MCF-
concept provided in this paper, which differs from previous definitions only when
distribution matters.
When distribution matters, the second best is less straightforward because the
distributional aspects of both public goods and the taxes used to fund them should
be taken into account. Since the poor have higher utility of money than the rich,
the distributional cost of taxation will be lower if more of the tax burden is borne
by the rich. However, taxes that are conditional on income are distortive and
thus likely to cause efficiency losses. With regards to the public good itself, a
progressive public good from which the poor derives greater utility than the rich
increases welfare more than a regressive good for which it is the other way around
(when the aggregate marginal willingness to pay is the same). It follows that with
concerns for distribution, an additional argument is raised against the conclusion
that provision of public goods should always be lower in the second best than in
the first best (Pigou, 1947).
To tackle these issues in a transparent and consistent manner, both in the
evaluation of public projects and in the design of tax policy, one should use meth-
ods that distinguish clearly between the distributional properties of public goods
themselves and of the taxes used for funding. We show in this paper that the stan-
dard MCF measure attributes parts of the distributional effects of taxation to the
public good. This leads to a significant underestimation of the funding costs and
a corresponding misrepresentation of the distributional effects of public projects.
The measures for the funding costs and for the distributional characteristics of
public goods proposed in this paper distinguish clearly between the two sources of
distributional consequences of providing a tax-funded public good, and therefore
solve this problem.
To provide these measures for the funding costs and the distributional charac-
teristics of public goods, we define a specific and hypothetical ILS tax scheme that
1If the labour supply curve is backward bending MCF could be less than one also in repre-
sentative agent models, cf. Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) and Atkinson and Stern (1974).
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is non-distortive and distributionally neutral. This tax scheme is used as a bench-
mark. The benchmark ILS tax scheme increases government revenue by reducing
the utility of all individuals by the same amount. Since money has lower value to
the rich than to the poor, the taxes on the rich have to be higher than the taxes
on the poor, in order for utility to be reduced equally for all individuals. Because
this hypothetical tax scheme is distributionally neutral and creates no efficiency
loss, we set the MCF to one for this scheme.
In contrast, the previous literature implicitly uses a uniform lump-sum (ULS)
tax as the benchmark for the MCF (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980; Sandmo, 1998;
Gahvari, 2006; Kleven & Kreiner, 2006; Kreiner & Verdelin, 2012; Jacobs, 2018).
Consequently, from this literature it could be concluded that the MCF of the ULS
tax is one if it is the only tax and always less than one if combined with a distortive
income tax to achieve the second best (Sandmo, 1998, p. 372, 376). However, a
ULS tax raises government revenue by reducing income by the same amount for
all individuals, which means that utility is reduced more for the poor than for the
rich. This regressivity of the ULS tax is not taken into account in the measure
of the MCF used in the previous literature. With the MCF measure proposed in
this paper, the MCF of the regressive ULS tax is instead always greater than one
when it is the only tax. If combined with a distortive income tax, the MCF of the
ULS tax could be smaller than one also with this new measure of MCF – but it
will always be greater than the MCF of the previous literature.
We also propose a new measure for the distributional characteristics of public
goods. We define a public good as distributionally neutral if an additional unit
increases the utility of all individuals equally, regardless of their income. Corre-
spondingly, public goods that increase the utility of the rich more than the poor
are defined as regressive, and vice versa. Based on these definitions, we introduce a
corrective factor which can be applied to the aggregate marginal willingness to pay
for the public good to account for the distributional aspects. For distributionally
neutral public goods, the corrective factor is equal to one, while for regressive and
progressive goods it is less than one and greater than one, respectively.
Our measure for the distributional characteristics of the public good also differs
from the previous literature. The corresponding corrective factor of the previous
literature is set equal to one when the marginal willingness to pay for a public good
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is equal for all individuals, regardless of their income, see for example Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1980), Sandmo (1998) or Wilson (1991). However, for the marginal
willingness to pay for a public good to be the same for all individuals, the marginal
utility of the good must be higher for the poor than for the rich. Within the new
framework proposed in this paper, such a public good is defined as progressive and
its corrective factor is greater than one.
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Sandmo (1998) are seminal contributions to
the literature on inequality and provision of public goods. Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980, p. 494) emphasizes that "the conditions for the optimum supply of public
goods are influenced by distributional considerations". Correspondingly, Sandmo
(1998) argues that tax schemes are designed to take into account governments’
preferences for income distribution. Therefore, when measuring the costs of taxa-
tion, one should include distributional effects.
Essentially, as pointed out by Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001, p. 192), the choice
of benchmark for the MCF is about normalization. If the cost and benefits of
public goods are to be expressed in monetary terms or by the use of a numeraire
good, marginal utility has to be translated through normalization. The choice of
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Sandmo (1998) was to divide the shadow cost
of the public budget constraint by the average marginal utility of money. This
approach has been adopted by a number of later contributions to this literature,
see for example Gahvari (2006); Kleven and Kreiner (2006); Kreiner and Verdelin
(2012); Jacobs (2018). This normalization is usually considered the standard ap-
proach for measuring the MCF.2,3
Ballard and Fullerton (1992) divide the early contributions to the literature on
the MCF into two categories. The first category includes Harberger (1964) and
Browning (1976, 1987), and was labeled the Pigou-Harberger-Browning (PHB)
approach. This approach was essentially based on measuring the deadweight loss
2In the case where the government maximizes a social welfare function of the type W =
W (v1, ..., vn), the variable used for normalization is βˉ =
1
n
∑
i βi where βi = Wiλi represents the
marginal social value of money of consumer i.
3Because the MCF of lump-sum taxes could be different from one when they are combined
with distortionary taxes, Jacobs (2018) proposes a normalization method previously used by
Håkonsen (1998), based on Diamond (1975). This normalization implies that the MCF of a
lump-sum tax is always one. Holtsmark (2019) discusses Jacobs’ proposal.
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when a distortionary tax is used to collect revenue, while the entire revenue is
paid back to individuals as a lump-sum transfer. In this way the income effect
of the tax was cancelled out. Using this approach, the MCF of a distortionary
tax is always greater than one, since it only captures the substitution effect. The
conclusions from this strand of the literature are in line with Pigou’s conjecture
that with distortionary taxes the Samuelson rule will lead to oversupply of public
goods (Pigou, 1947, p. 34).
Ballard and Fullerton (1992) labeled the second category of this early liter-
ature the Stiglitz-Dasgupta-Atkinson-Stern (SDAS) approach after Stiglitz and
Dasgupta (1971) and Atkinson and Stern (1974). These contributions show that
because of the income effect on labour supply, funding through distortionary taxes
does not always imply that the Samuelson rule leads to overprovision of public
goods. If labor supply is inefficiently low, for example due to other distortionary
taxes that are already in place, the income effect of additional taxation normally
leads to an increase in labor supply, representing an efficiency gain. Thus, if the
income effect is stronger than the substitution effect for the specific tax scheme
in question, a marginal increase in the revenue raised by taxation could improve
efficiency. If that is the case, the resulting MCF would be less than one.4
As most of the more recent literature, we investigate distributional aspects
within an SDAS-approach.
The paper is organized as follows. The model, definitions and main results
are presented in Section 2, while Section 3 presents some numerical examples
to illustrate the main findings of the paper. Section 4 concludes. An appendix
includes a proof related to the main results and a detailed description of the model
used in the numerical examples.
4It should here be noted that also Wildasin (1984, p. 229) pointed to the difference between
what he called the Pigou-Browning approach and the Atkinson-Stern-approach, respectively.
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2 The model
Let there be a total of n individuals, with subscript i ∈ {1, . . . , n} denoting indi-
vidual i. Individual i’s utility is given by:
ui = u(ci, li, G), (1)
where ci is consumption of a (composite) private good, li is leisure and G is con-
sumption of a pure public good. We make the assumptions that uic, uil, uiG > 0,
that uicc < 0, and that uic →∞ as ci → 0 ∀i. Individuals provide labour supply
hi within the time endowment T . Hence, hi + li = T . Following Mirrlees (1971),
the labour productivity of individual i is given by wi, and varies across individuals.
This is the source of inequality in this model.
Labour is used in the production of both the private consumption good and
the public good. Let q be the unit cost of producing the public good in terms of
the private good, such that: ∑
i
ci + qG =
∑
i
wihi.
For our notation to be in line with the literature in the previous literature, we let
λi ≡ uic denote the marginal utility of income (net of taxes) for individual i and
λˉ be its average. Furthermore, for notational simplicity, we define
mi =
uiG
λi
,
individual i’s marginal willingness to pay for the public good.
2.1 The first-best allocation
We define the first-best allocation as the maximum of a utilitarian welfare function
W =
∑
i ui.
5 Given this welfare function, the first-best allocation in this economy
5It is common in this literature on the MCF to let the government maximize a more general
welfare function. The use of the less general, additive welfare function applied here does not
influence the main results but make the introduction to our approach significantly more readable.
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is defined by the following 2n first-order conditions:∑
j
ujG = qλi ∀i∑
j
ujG = quilωi ∀i.
The original Samuelson rule – defining the first-best provision of the public good
– follows from these equations: ∑
i
mi = q. (2)
2.2 The MCF and the second-best allocation
To provide the public good, the government must raise public revenue. First,
consider the case where the government can tax wage income, but can also use both
a uniform and an individual lump-sum tax. Let t > 0 represent a linear income
tax while bi and b represent individual and uniform lump-sum taxes, respectively.
The lump-sum taxes could be positive, zero, or negative, while we only consider
non-negative income taxes. Individual i then maximizes ui with respect to ci and
li, taking G as given, subject to the budget constraint:
ci = (1− t)wihi − bi − b,
The following first-order conditions solves individual i’s problem:
uil
λi
= (1− t)ωi
defining ci(t, b, bi, ωi, G), hi(t, b, bi, ωi, G) and li(t, b, bi, ωi, G). Let vi = v(t, b, bi, wi, G)
be the indirect utility of individual i. Using the envelope theorem gives:
∂vi
∂bi
=
∂vi
∂b
= −λi, (3)
∂vi
∂t
= −λiwihi.
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The government maximizes the utilitarian welfare function, which is now given
by W =
∑
i vi, subject to the public budget constraint
R = t
∑
i
wihi +
∑
i
bi + nb = qG. (5)
The corresponding Lagrange-function is:
Lg =
∑
i
v(t, b, bi, wi, G) + μ
(
t
∑
i
wihi +
∑
i
bi + nb− qG
)
.
When individual lump-sum taxes are available, neither a uniform lump-sum tax
nor a linear income tax will be applied by a welfare maximizing government. Con-
sider therefore the case with individual lump-sum taxes as the only source for
public funding, i.e. t = b = 0. The first order conditions for the government’s
maximization problem are then:
λi = μ, ∀ i = 1, ..., n,∑
i
uiG = μq.
This set of n + 1 first order conditions gives equation (2). Hence, we have the well
known result that public spending, G, and a set of ILS taxes could be set such
that first best, the Samuelson rule in (2), is achieved. It follows that with ILS
taxes there are no additional costs related to tax funding of public goods, in terms
of distortions or in terms of distributional effects.
Next, consider the more realistic case where the government can use only a
uniform lump-sum tax combined with a positive linear income tax. Now, bi = 0
and public revenue is R = t
∑
i wihi + nb. We rule out the case where b ≥ wjT if
wj = min(w1, ..., wn) in which the model has no solution.
The first-order conditions for the government’s maximization problem with
respect to the uniform lump-sum tax, b, the income tax, t, and the size of the
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public sector, G, are:
∑
i
λi = μ
(
t
∑
i
wi
∂hi
∂b
+ n
)
, (6)
∑
i
λiwihi = μ
(∑
i
wihi + t
∑
i
wi
∂hi
∂t
)
, (7)
∑
i
uiG = μ
(
q − t
∑
i
wi
∂hi
∂G
)
. (8)
Together with the public budget constraint, these three first order conditions give
second-best levels of the shadow-cost of the public budget constraint, μ, the ULS-
tax b, the linear income tax t, and public consumption G in second-best.
2.3 Benchmarks, definitions and interpretation of the first-
order conditions
Below we rewrite the first-order conditions (6)-(8) into two equations that provide
expressions for the size of the MCF. As mentioned in the introduction, the shadow
cost of the public budget constraint, μ, represents MCF. However, to have an op-
erative corrective factor that could be used in cost-benefit analyses, this shadow
cost has to be normalized in some way or another. It has been common to use
the average marginal utility of money, λˉ, for this normalization, see for exam-
ple Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Sandmo (1998) and several later contributions.
However, λˉ represents the aggregate welfare loss to individuals of collection of one
dollar with a uniform lump-sum tax, which means that each consumer pays the
same tax, in this case 1/n dollar. This is a regressive funding scheme. Hence,
normalizing μ with λˉ means that we evaluate the distributional properties of taxes
using a regressive tax as the benchmark for evaluation. We find it more reason-
able to evaluate the distributional effects of taxes using a distribution-neutral tax
scheme as the benchmark. We therefore make the following definition:
Definition 1 (Distribution-neutrality ). Additional revenue collection is distribution-
neutral if designed such that all individuals experience the same loss of utility. A
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public good is distribution-neutral on the margin if u1G = ... = unG.
This means that we need to define a factor for normalization which represents
the welfare costs of a distribution-neutral funding scheme. This benchmark scheme
should also be non-distortionary, as the ULS tax scheme of the previous literature.
From (3) we have that the increase dbi in the ILS tax paid by individual i when
the tax is increased so that the utility of individual i is reduced by −dui, is given
by
dbi = − 1
λi
dui, (9)
where 1/λi represents the money needed to increase the utility of individual i by
one unit. It follows that
∑
i(1/λi) represents the aggregate lump-sum transfer
needed to increase the utility of all individuals by one unit, i.e. in a distribution-
neutral manner. Along these lines, consider a case where a set of individual
lump-sum taxes are designed to give an aggregate additional tax revenue dR in
a distribution-neutral manner, i.e. such that all individuals experience the same
utility loss −du. From (9) we have that
dR = −
(∑
i
1
λi
)
du.
Define
θ =
1
1
n
∑
i
1
λi
. (10)
Then we have that:
−n ∙ du = θ ∙ dR. (11)
It follows that θ represents the welfare cost of a tax change which is distribution-
neutral and does not influence efficiency. A less precise interpretation is that θ
represents the welfare gain of one additional dollar distributed to the individuals
such that all have the same utility gain. Put differently, θ represents the welfare
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gain of a dollar that is shared by the individuals in a distribution-neutral manner.
Before we proceed, we define the MCF concept of this paper:
Definition 2 (The marginal cost of public funds). The marginal cost of
public funds (MCF) is the marginal welfare cost of revenue collection relative to
the marginal welfare cost of a distribution-neutral revenue collection that does not
alter efficiency.
Definition 2 means that θ represents a benchmark for measuring the MCF.
Define the following variables:
yi = wihi, (12)
Y =
∑
i
yi, (13)
δG =
cov(
1
λi
, uiG)(
1
n
∑
i
1
λi
)(
1
n
∑
i
uiG
) , (14)
δt =
cov(λi, yi)
λˉyˉ
, (15)
where yˉ = (1/n)
∑
i yi. Dividing both sides of the first order conditions (6), (7),
and (8) with θ and using the formula for a covariance:
∑
i
uiG
λi
= n ∙ cov( 1
λi
, uiG) +
1
n
∑
i
1
λi
∑
i
uiG,
gives then the two following first order conditions for optimal taxation and size of
the public sector:
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11 + δG
∑
i
mi =
λˉ
θ
1
1 +
t
n
∂Y
∂b
[
q − ∂R
∂G
]
, (16)
1
1 + δG
∑
i
mi =
λˉ(1 + δt)
θ
1
1 +
t
Y
∂Y
∂t
[
q − ∂R
∂G
]
. (17)
Now compare the equations (16) and (17) with the original Samuelson rule
which says that
∑
i mi = q in the first best. The left hand sides of (16) and
(17) include in addition to
∑
i mi a fraction which corrects the benefit side of
the equation with regard to the distributional properties of the public good. If the
public good is distribution-neutral according to Definition 1, then δG = 0 and there
should be no correction of the Samuelson rule related to distributional properties
of the public good.
If there is a pattern where the poor have higher marginal benefits from the
public project than the rich, then cov(1/λi, uiG) < 0, and we are dealing with
a progressive public good. In that case δG < 0 and (16) and (17) show that
such distributional characteristics of the public good draw in the direction of more
supply than given by the Samuelson rule, and the other way around when the rich
have higher marginal benefits from the public good compared to the poor.
The case when all individuals have the same willingness to pay for the public
good, i.e. m1 = .... = mn, represents a special case of a progressive good. We will
return to that case below.
With regard to the right hand sides of (16) and (17), the square brackets
represent the net costs of the public project when it is taken into account that
public projects might influence labour supply and thereby also public revenue.
The two fractions on the right hand sides together represent the MCF of the ULS
tax and the linear income tax, respectively . The second of these two fractions in
each first-order condition represents the revenue effects of altered labour supply
caused by the a marginal increase in the ULS tax and the linear income tax,
respectively. These fractions are standard in the literature within the SDAS-
approach, irrespective of whether a single individual is considered as in Mayshar
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(1990, 1991) or there is a set of heterogenous individuals as in Dahlby (1998);
Sandmo (1998); Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995); Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001).
The first fractions on the right hand sides of equations (16) and (17) are differ-
ent from previous literature. They represent factors for correction of the produc-
tion cost with regards to the distributional aspects of each tax, when a distribution-
neutral tax-funding scheme is used as the benchmark. To investigate closer these
these expressions, we simplify and move to the case where a ULS scheme is the
only source for public funding.
2.4 Distributional effects when a public good is funded with
a uniform lump-sum tax
When considering the case with a uniform lump-sum tax as the only source for
public revenue, the first-order condition (16) can be written as follows:
1
1 + δG
∑
i
mi =
λˉ
θ
q. (18)
Again, the corrective factor related to distributional characteristics of the public
good is on the left hand side, while distributional effects related to funding are
accounted for on the right hand side. Because only lump-sum taxes are in use,
there are no terms related to effects on efficiency.
First, consider the right hand side of (18). λˉ represents the welfare loss to
individuals if one additional USD is collected with ULS. In comparison, θ, defined
in (10), measures the aggregate welfare loss if one additional USD is collected in a
distribution-neutral ILS-scheme. Because there are no efficiency losses from ULS-
funding, the MCF of an ULS-funded tax is related to its effect on distribution
only. It follows that λˉ/θ represents MCF using ULS, cf. Definition 2. We have
the following result:
Proposition 1 (MCF of ULS). When a uniform lump-sum tax is the only tax
implemented, and at least two of the n individuals have different productivities,
then
• MCF > 1
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• MCF →∞ as b → wjT when wj ≤ wj ∀j 6= i.
Proof. With regard to the first part of Proposition 1, it was shown above that λˉ/θ
represents MCF when a uniform lump-sum tax is the only tax in use. It is shown
in Appendix A that λˉ/θ > 1 if there are variation in individuals’ productivities.
With regard to the second part, it follows from the properties of the utility function
that λj →∞ as b → wjT from below. Hence, λˉ/θ →∞ as b → wjT .
The first part of Proposition 1 reflects that ULS is a regressive tax. If individ-
uals’ productivities vary, ULS funding will always give higher funding costs than a
distribution-neutral ILS tax. This is in contrast to what follows from the standard
definition of MCF, see for example Sandmo (1998, p. 372) who states that when a
uniform lump-sum tax is the only source of government revenue, then MCF = 1.6
The second part of Proposition 1 says that if there are no individuals with lower
productivity than individual j, then MCF of a lump-sum tax becomes large when
the tax converges from below toward individual j’s maximum possible income, i.e.
b → wjT . This reflects that distributional concerns have been included in MCF of
the uniform lump-sum tax. In contrast, the standard MCF-measure of the uniform
lump-sum tax is still 1 in this situation even though the poorest individual has
close to zero after-tax income. These properties of MCF with a lump-sum tax is
illustrated by Figure 1 (p. 24).
Before we proceed, a result comes out of this discussion:
Proposition 2 (Optimal provision of a distribution neutral public good).
When the public good on the margin is distribution-neutral and a uniform lump-
sum tax is the only funding source, the level of public consumption should be lower
than prescribed by the Samuelson rule.
Proof. When the public good is distribution-neutral on the margin, then the frac-
tion on the left hand side of equation (18) is equal to 1. The fraction on the right
hand side, λˉ/θ, is greater than one when the funding source is a lump-sum tax.
6Sandmo (1998) stated that "It may seem surprising that the MCF in this case does not reflect
distributional concerns at all; after all, this is a regressive form of tax finance. [...] But it should
be stressed that this does not imply absence of distributional concerns from the cost-benefit
calculations; it simply means that these concerns are reflected in the evaluation of benefits." We
argue that, partly, these distributional concerns should have be included in the costs.
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Hence, there should be a correction on the cost side of the Samuelson equation
but not on the benefit side.
It could at this point be useful to go back to two important previous studies.
In the case with a ULS tax and when t = 0, both Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p.
496) and Sandmo (1998, p. 372) formulated the f.o.c. as follows:∑
i
mi(1 + δz) = q,
where they defined
δz =
cov(λi,mi)
λˉmˉ
.
In both these contributions δz was labeled the distributional characteristics of
the public good. We argue, however, that their variable δz represents not only
distributional properties of the public good, but also distributional properties of
the ULS tax. To see this, use the formula for the covariance to find that:
1 + δz =
∑
i
uiG
1
n
∑
i
λi
∑
i
uiG
λi
. (19)
Recall the case discussed above, where individual j has lowest productivity and
that λj → ∞ as b → wjT . It follows from (19) that the corrective factor (1 +
δz) → 0 as b → wjT . This does not reflect that distributional effects of the
public good makes additional production unacceptable. It reflects the prohibitive
distributional costs of increasing the lump-sum tax further when a level is reached
where individual j is left with close to zero net income despite his labour supply
is close to T .
Consider again the case where m1 = .... = mn, i.e. all individuals have the
same willingness to pay for the public good, which means that the distributional
characteristics, δz, as defined in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 496) and Sandmo
(1998, p. 372), is zero. In good match, Wilson (1991, p. 159) defined a public
good as distribution-neutral when individuals have the same willingness to pay
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for the public good.7 We have found it more reasonable to consider public goods
with such distributional properties as progressive, because it means that even the
poorest individual is willing to pay as much for a unit of the good as the richest
one. In accordance with this, δG < 0, and the corrective factor 1/(1+δG) > 1 when
m1 = .... = mn. Hence, the progressivity of the public good draws in the direction
of higher supply of the public good than given by the Samuelson rule. At the same
time, the poor pay the same tax as the rich. This regressive restriction from the
tax system increases the costs of funding because the poor have a higher marginal
utility of money compared to the rich, thus λˉ/θ > 1. When m1 = .... = mn, the
benefits related to the progressivity of the public project happens to be exactly
as big as the distributional cost related to a ULS tax, i.e. 1/(1 + δG) = λˉ/θ.
Hence, correction of the Samuelson rule with regard to distributional effects of the
public good exactly offsets the corresponding appropriate correction related to the
funding costs.8
2.5 Distributional and efficiency aspects of a linear income
tax
This section considers the case with an income tax. The starting point is then
the first order condition (17). Because the left hand side of (17) has already been
discussed, the focus is in the following on the right hand side. The second fraction
represents what Mayshar and Yitzhaki (1995) labeled the marginal efficiency costs
of funding (MECF). Studies with single individual models, as for example Mayshar
(1991) and Wildasin (1984), see equation (1) in both, include corresponding ex-
pressions. If the labour supply elasticity with respect to the effective wage rate
is positive (negative), i.e. the substitution effect is stronger (smaller) than the
income effect, then MECF>1 (<1).
The focus in this paper is on the first fraction on the r.h.s. which corrects for
7Wilson (1991) defined a public good as distributionally-neutral when the covariance between
the individuals willingness to pay for the public good, mi, and the "social marginal utility
of income", as defined by Diamond (1975), is zero. When there are no distortionary taxes,
Diamond’s social marginal utility of money is identical to the private utility of money, λi.
8This has relevance to the discussion in Kaplow (1996, 2004). He considered several cases
where distributional effects of the public good were offset by distributional effects of a tax ad-
justment, see also Christiansen (1981, 2007).
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the distributional effect of the income tax. The factor (1 + δt), which Sandmo
(1998, p. 373) labeled the distributional characteristic of the marginal tax rate,
is also found in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 494). As already mentioned, both
used the regressive ULS-tax as a benchmark for measuring the MCF. Because
we have found that a distribution-neutral funding scheme is a better choice as
benchmark, we multiply with (λˉ/θ), the distributional costs of ULS relative to a
distribution-neutral funding scheme, see equation (16).
With regard to the size of δt, individual incomes yi are assumed to increase
with ability wi (agent monotonicity). Thus, cov(λi, yi) is negative, which means
that δt < 0. Using the formula for the covariance we find that:
δt =
1
n
∑
i
λiwihi
λˉyˉ
− 1. (20)
Because the fraction is positive, we have that 0 < 1 + δt < 1. Thus, this factor
reduces the MCF of a linear income tax compared to the MCF of a ULS tax, which
reflects that a linear income tax always has better distributional properties than
a ULS tax. At the same time, from Proposition 1 we know that λˉ/θ > 1. This
means that we cannot on a general basis conclude whether λˉ(1 + δt)/θ is greater
or smaller than one. We have the following result:
Proposition 3 (MCF of a linear income tax). When a linear income tax
is the only tax implemented, and at least two of the n individuals have different
productivities, then the MCF with a distribution neutral benchmark could be both
smaller than, equal to, or greater than 1, but will always be greater than the MCF
measure based on the standard definition.
Proof. Both the first and the second fraction on the right hand side of equation
(17) could both be both greater, equal to, or smaller than one. The difference
between an MCF with a distribution-neutral benchmark and the standard MCF
measure is that the first represents the shadow cost of the public constraint divided
with θ while the latter with λˉ. It is shown in the appendix that λˉ > θ.
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2.6 Optimal taxation
In the optimal tax system, a trade-off is made between the distributional cost of
the ULS tax and the efficiency loss caused by the income tax. When both taxes are
set optimally, the MCF must be the same for both sources of funds (Wilson, 1991,
p. 159). Since the MCF for the ULS tax and for the linear income tax are equal to
the terms preceding the net production cost, [q − ∂R/∂G], in the respective first
order conditions (16) and (17), these terms must be equal to each other and both
represent the MCF in the optimal tax system. Thus, in an optimal tax system we
have that:
MCF =
λˉ
θ
1
1 +
t
n
∂Y
∂b
=
λˉ(1 + δt)
θ
1
1 +
t
Y
∂Y
∂t
. (21)
It can be seen from this expression that at the optimum the difference between
the distributional cost of the income tax compared to the lump-sum tax, given
by the expression (1 + δt), is equal to the difference between the efficiency terms,
represented by the second fractions on the right hand sides of equations (16) and
(17).
Proposition 4 (MCF with optimal taxation). With an optimal combination
of a linear income tax t with a lump-sum tax b, then
• MCF S 1
• MCF →∞ as twjT + b → wjT when wj ≤ wj ∀j 6= i.
Proof. The first statement of Proposition 4 can be proven either by a similar
argument as in the proof of Proposition 3, or by the fact that the first fraction
of the right hand side of equation (16) is greater than one by Proposition 1 while
the second fraction of the right hand side of equation (17) is less than one because
leisure is a normal good so that the income effect on labour is positive.
With regard to the second statement of Proposition 4, we know from the proof
of Proposition 1 that λˉ/θ → ∞ as b → wjT . From (20) we have that (1 + δt)
does not converge toward zero when b → wjT . Neither are there reasons why
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the denominators of the second fractions on the right hand sides of (16) and (17)
should converge toward infinity when b → wjT .
The conclusion that MCF could be both less than, equal to or greater than
one in the optimal tax system, differs from the previous literature. When the
regressive ULS tax is used as the benchmark, the MCF in the optimal tax system
is always less than one at the optimal tax system, see for example Sandmo (1998,
p. 376). However, as discussed in this paper, for this MCF measure to be used,
the benefit side of the Samuelson rule, for all but the most progressive goods must
be adjusted downwards.
3 Numerical illustrations
To illustrate some of the results of the present paper, simulations of a numerical
model with 10 individuals were carried out. For detailed description of the applied,
model, see Appendix A. The utility functions given in equation (1) were specified
as CES-functions that include private consumption, leisure, and public consump-
tion. The elasticity of substitution between leisure and private consumption was
assumed to be 1.25, which means that the labour supply curve is upward sloping.
The public budget constraint applies which means that in all simulations the entire
net public revenue is used for production of the public good or transfers (negative
lump-sum taxes).
Figure 1 shows numerical examples where public consumption is funded with
either a ULS tax or a linear income tax. The horizontal axis measures public
consumption. The vertical axis measures MCF.
The green solid double-line shows MCF of a uniform lump-sum tax when the
ULS-tax is the only source of public funding and MCF is defined according to
Definition 2, where distribution neutrality is given by Definition 1. In accordance
with Proposition 1, and because a ULS tax is regressive, MCF with ULS is found
to be greater 1 at all tax levels and it converges toward infinity when the lump-
sum tax becomes close to 24 because the individual with lowest productivity has
a time endowment T = 24 and a productivity w1 = 1, cf. the second bullet
point of Proposition 1. For comparison, MCF of a uniform lump-sum tax using
the standard definition is given by the green, broken double-line. Because we here
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considered a case where the lump-sum tax is the only tax, and because the standard
definition of MCF uses the distributional properties of a uniform lump-sum tax as
the benchmark, this MCF measure is always equal to 1, see for example Sandmo
(1998, p. 372).
The black solid line shows MCF of a linear income tax when the this tax is
the only source of public funding and MCF is defined according to Definition 2.
For tax rates below 0.34, MCF of the income tax is less than 1. For comparison,
the black broken line shows MCF of a linear income tax with what has been the
standard approach. In accordance with Proposition x, this line is below the solid
line, which represents MCF of the linear income tax with our definition.
Figure 2 shows a numerical example where different levels of public consump-
tion are funded with an optimal combination of a ULS-tax and a linear income
tax. For zero and low levels of public consumption the lump-sum tax is negative.
In accordance with Proposition y, the lower diagram shows that MCF with our
definition and with optimal taxation could be both below, equal to, and higher
than 1. As in the case where ULS-tax is the only source of public funding, MCF
converges toward infinity doe to the unfortunate effects of income distribution
when the total tax bill becomes close to the maximum possible income level of the
poorest consumer. However, because the lump-sum tax now is combined with an
income tax, this happens at a higher level of public consumption.
The broken line of the lower diagram (Figure 2) shows that MCF with the
standard definition and optimal taxation is always below 1, in accordance with
findings i several papers, see for example Sandmo (1998, p. 376).
4 Conclusion
Decisions about the provision of public goods should be based on a clear under-
standing of both the benefits of public goods and the costs of funding them with
taxes. If there is inequality and the benefits of public goods are measured in mon-
etary terms, attention must be paid to the fact that money has greater value to
the poor than to the rich. When redistribution is costly, a corrective factor has
to be applied to the willingness to pay for a public good in order to provide more
of the goods that benefit the poor and less of the goods that benefit the rich. For
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Figure 1: Two numerical examples with different levels of public consumption
funded with a lump-sum tax or a linear income tax, respectively. The solid double-
line shows MCF of a uniform lump-sum tax when we have defined MCF as in this
paper (with a distribution-neutral benchmark). The broken double-line shows
MCF of a uniform lump-sum tax with the standard definition. The black solid
line shows MCF as defined in the present paper with a linear income tax. The
broken black line shows MCF with the standard definition and a linear income
tax.
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Figure 2: A numerical example with different levels of public consumption funded
with an optimal combination of a uniform lump-sum tax and a linear income tax.
The upper diagram shows the tax levels and the lower the MCF-levels.
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the funding, both the efficiency loss from distortive taxation and the distributional
properties of taxes have to be taken into account. The MCF should be a corrective
factor that captures both these aspects of taxation, to be applied to the direct cost
of providing a public good to arrive at the actual cost to society of providing it.
The main contribution of this paper is to establish a measure for the MCF that
more correctly accounts for the distributional aspects of taxation. Because this
MCF measure is based on a non-distortive and distributionally neutral benchmark
tax, it accurately captures all the distributional effects of a specific tax or the
marginal source of public funds. Correspondingly, the paper also proposes a cor-
rective factor for the willingness to pay for public goods that accurately captures
the distributional characteristics of a public good.
This paper shows that the MCF measure of previous literature attributes parts
of the distributional effects of taxation to the measure for the distributional char-
acteristics of the public good. The reason for this failure to account precisely for
the distributional effects of taxation is that the literature uses the regressive ULS
tax as the benchmark against which the distributional effects of other taxes are
measured.
We believe that our proposed measure for the MCF and for the distributional
characteristics of public goods are more intuitive and more in line with the gen-
eral understanding of inequality and redistribution. A clear distinction between
the distributional effects of the taxes and those of public goods should make the
important insights from the literature on distributional concerns more accessible.
The result could be that distributional effects are more properly accounted for in
cost-benefit analyses of public projects.
With the measures of this paper, the case where all individuals on the margin
get the same utility from the public good is particularly straightforward. With such
public goods, which we have defined as distributionally neutral, there is no need
to correct the left hand (benefit) side of the Samuelson rule (the total willingness
to pay for the public good) because the corrective factor of this paper is one
in this case. For comparison, the case with the MCF measure of the previous
literature, the case that does not require correction of the benefit side is when the
willingness to pay is the same for all individuals. For all individuals to have the
same willingness to pay, and because the poor have higher margin utility of income,
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they must also get greater utility from that public good. With our definitions Â–
and to most people, we believe Â– such a public good is progressive. Hence, our
setup is also a response to the timely concern of Christiansen (2007) about the
difficulties on collecting this type of information empirically.
For all public goods but the most progressive, the willingness to pay has to
be adjusted downwards when the MCF measure of the previous literature is used.
The reason for this downwards adjustment is that the regressive ULS tax used
as the benchmark for measuring the distributional effects of public spending. If
the MCF measure of the previous literature is applied without the corresponding
adjustment on the benefit side, the net benefits to society will be misrepresented
and this may lead to public goods provision which does not lead to the second
best. Because the MCF measure of the previous literature is lower than the real
costs of taxation, neutral, regressive and even some progressive public goods will
be overprovided. On the other hand, sufficiently progressive public goods will still
be underprovided, compared to the second best.
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Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. For the first part of first part of Proposition 1, it is necessary to show that
λˉ/θ > 1. An underlying assumption here is that marginal utility of money is
positive for all individuals.
We have that from the definition of θ in (10) that
λˉ/θ =
1
n2
∑
i
λi
∑
j
1
λj
.
Further manipulation gives that:
λˉ/θ =
1
n
+
1
n2
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
λi
λj
. (A.1)
Let j 6= i, then the last term on the right hand side of (A.1) could be manipulated
to:
1
n2
∑
i<n
∑
j>i
(
λi
λj
+
λj
λi
)
=
1
n2
∑
i<n
∑
j>i
(
λ2i
λjλi
+
λ2j
λiλj
)
=
1
n2
∑
i<n
∑
j>i
(
λ2i + λ
2
j
λjλi
)
=
2
n2
∑
i<n
∑
j>i
(
(λi − λj)2 + 2λiλj
2λjλi
)
Hence, we have that
λˉ/θ =
1
n
+
2
n2
∑
i<n
∑
j>i
[
(λi − λj)2 + 2λiλj
2λjλi
]
. (A.2)
The expression within the square brackets cannot be less than one. There are
n(n − 1)/2 of these. Hence, the second term on the right hand side cannot be
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smaller than 1− 1/n. Thus λˉ/θ ≥ 1.
B Description of the model used in the numerical
example
In the numerical model used for illustrative purposes in section 4, there are n = 10
individuals with the following utility function:
ui = x
(
α1−ρcρi + β
1−ρlρi + γ
1−ρGρ
) 1
ρ
where x, α, β, γ, and ρ are parameters. Define
s =
1
1− ρ.
s is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure and was set
to 1.25. The parameters α and β where calibrated such that α1−ρ = 0.3 and
β1−ρ = 0.7.
The wage rates were determined such that:
w1 = 1
wi = (wi−1)g if i > 1,
were g is a parameter which was calibrated to a value that gave a Gini-index of
gross income distribution of 27.5 in second best. Both the individual wage rates
and individual before and after tax incomes in second best are shown in Figure 2.
(B.0)
The complete list of applied parameter values follows:
Parameter Value Parameter Value
x 0.25 γ 0.10
α 0.22 β 0.64
ρ 0.20 s 1.25
T 24.00 g 1.03
(B.1)
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Figure 3: Wage rates wi and gross and net incomes in second best, for i = 1, ..., 10.
Second best was achieved with an effective tax rate t∗ = 0.25 combined with
an effective lump-sum transfer a∗ = −3.30. individuals spent between 8.4 and 9.2
time units working of total time endowments of T = 24 time units. An effective
level t∗ = 0.41 gave welfare maximum if the lump-sum transfer was set to zero.
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